Today, I really want to address CNN’s latest take, titled, “Western allies receive increasingly ‘sobering’ updates on Ukraine’s counteroffensive: ‘This is the most difficult time of the war.’”
The overall tenor of the article is basically the idea that Ukraine’s counteroffensive is going badly, and its military is suffering heavy losses.
Here are some quotes:
“Ukrainian forces have incurred staggering losses [around Robotyne] leading Ukrainian commanders to hold back some units to regroup and reduce casualties.”
We have numbers to indicate the approximate ratio of losses between Ukraine and Russia based on visually confirmed losses. And AT WORST, the numbers range from being approximately even to being significantly worse for Russia (around 1.7 Russian losses for each Ukrainian equipment loss).
Russian artillery loss ratios are known to be particularly bad, with a loss ratio of around 3 Russian:1 Ukrainian.
However, if Russia is losing 15 artillery pieces a day, even at a 3-to-1 ratio, that means Ukraine is losing five. If Russia is losing around 500 soldiers a day, Ukraine is likely losing 300.
Now, Ukraine’s General Staff estimates of Russian infantry losses are likely an overcount, so say we cut it by half (counted as killed and wounded).
Over the course of two months, that adds up to 15,000 Russian losses and 9,000 Ukrainian losses. These losses are distributed over many battlefields, from Kupiansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne. But overall, they are horrific losses amounting to between five and seven Russian brigades and three to five Ukrainian brigades entirely eliminated.
Ukraine is undoubtedly rushing reinforcements to the front, and so is Russia.
But it’s in armor losses where Ukraine carries the greatest advantage.
Since June, Western allies have delivered, or newly promised, approximately 600 new armored fighting vehicles:
Russian production of new tanks is estimated at around 20 to 30 per month, while IFV production amounts to 30 to 40 per month So while Russia was producing roughly 150 armored vehicles, Western allies delivered around 600 to Ukraine. And the U.S. has a lot more Bradleys and Strykers in storage to send.
Russia is trying to make up the gap by refurbishing 70-year-old BMP1s and T-55s, but this is degrading the quality of its weaponry.
Ukraine can make good on its horrific losses. Russia cannot.
“Russians have a number of defensive lines and they [Ukrainian forces] haven’t really gone through the first line.”
This isn’t really true of either of Ukraine’s main offensives. Ukraine has successfully breached Russia’s first trench line of defense—if you consider Russia to have four lines of defense.
Here’s the confusion. Russia either has TWO main lines of defense (with Dragons Teeth lines and fortifications), or FOUR major lines of defense, if you count each bracketed line of contiguous trenches.
If you consider only the strongest Russian defense line to be a “main defense line,” then Russia only has two layers of defense and Ukraine’s up against the first one now, around Verbove.
If you consider Russia to have FOUR lines of defense, Ukraine has breached the first of them.
So either Ukraine hasn’t breached a defense line yet but Russia only has two lines of defense north of Tokmak, or we consider Russia to have anywhere from four to seven lines of defense—with four lines, you can say Ukraine’s breached one line of defense. With the seven-line tabulation, Ukraine has breached two lines already.
For Ukraine pessimists, there’s a tendency to suggest Russia has SO MANY lines of defense and Ukraine hasn’t breached any of them. That is nonsense. It’s necessary to nail down what exactly a person considers a line of defense to determine, “How many does Russia have?” and, “Has Ukraine breached any?”
This is ignoring the fact Ukraine is within five miles of Russia’s only defense line south of Velyka Novosilka.
Here, an advance of just six to seven miles would mean Ukraine has broken through Russia’s vaunted defense line and is behind the line of defense.
“The approach of fall, when weather and fighting conditions are expected to worsen, gives Ukrainian forces a limited window to push forward.”
It should also be noted that the climate during mud season in southern Ukraine is much different from conditions in the north and east. The Black Sea climate renders the terrain in southern Ukraine far drier and less cold, with temperatures rarely dipping below freezing in many parts of southern Ukraine. Fall mud season is mild compared to the spring mud season in northern Ukraine, but it is even more so in the south.
There is a reason why Ukraine continued last year’s Kherson offensive right into November, even as the fall rains had already started in northern Ukraine and began to shift into early winter weather.
There will likely be a wetter, muddier period in the south from October to November. But such weather didn’t really stop the Kherson Offensive, and if Ukraine is pressing smaller-unit attritional attacks like it is now, it is unlikely to have that big of an impact—not like the way the mud can swallow tanks whole and bring entire armies to a standstill in the north.
While Ukraine punching through to Tokmak or breaking out south of Velyka Novosilka by late September would be ideal, today’s situation is not the ticking clock of doom that the CNN article appears to paint it as.
The overall tenor of the article is basically the idea that Ukraine’s counteroffensive is going badly, and its military is suffering heavy losses.
Here are some quotes:
“Ukrainian forces have incurred staggering losses [around Robotyne] leading Ukrainian commanders to hold back some units to regroup and reduce casualties.”
We have numbers to indicate the approximate ratio of losses between Ukraine and Russia based on visually confirmed losses. And AT WORST, the numbers range from being approximately even to being significantly worse for Russia (around 1.7 Russian losses for each Ukrainian equipment loss).
Russian artillery loss ratios are known to be particularly bad, with a loss ratio of around 3 Russian:1 Ukrainian.
However, if Russia is losing 15 artillery pieces a day, even at a 3-to-1 ratio, that means Ukraine is losing five. If Russia is losing around 500 soldiers a day, Ukraine is likely losing 300.
Now, Ukraine’s General Staff estimates of Russian infantry losses are likely an overcount, so say we cut it by half (counted as killed and wounded).
Over the course of two months, that adds up to 15,000 Russian losses and 9,000 Ukrainian losses. These losses are distributed over many battlefields, from Kupiansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne. But overall, they are horrific losses amounting to between five and seven Russian brigades and three to five Ukrainian brigades entirely eliminated.
Ukraine is undoubtedly rushing reinforcements to the front, and so is Russia.
But it’s in armor losses where Ukraine carries the greatest advantage.
Since June, Western allies have delivered, or newly promised, approximately 600 new armored fighting vehicles:
- 60 Marder Infantry Fighting Vehicles.
- 81 Bradley IFVs.
- 200 KTO Rosomak IFVs.
- 83 Stryker IFVs.
- 64 Bandvagn Armored Personnel Carriers.
- 100 BTR-60 APCs.
- 10 Leopard 1A5 tanks.
Russian production of new tanks is estimated at around 20 to 30 per month, while IFV production amounts to 30 to 40 per month So while Russia was producing roughly 150 armored vehicles, Western allies delivered around 600 to Ukraine. And the U.S. has a lot more Bradleys and Strykers in storage to send.
Russia is trying to make up the gap by refurbishing 70-year-old BMP1s and T-55s, but this is degrading the quality of its weaponry.
Ukraine can make good on its horrific losses. Russia cannot.
“Russians have a number of defensive lines and they [Ukrainian forces] haven’t really gone through the first line.”
This isn’t really true of either of Ukraine’s main offensives. Ukraine has successfully breached Russia’s first trench line of defense—if you consider Russia to have four lines of defense.
Here’s the confusion. Russia either has TWO main lines of defense (with Dragons Teeth lines and fortifications), or FOUR major lines of defense, if you count each bracketed line of contiguous trenches.
If you consider only the strongest Russian defense line to be a “main defense line,” then Russia only has two layers of defense and Ukraine’s up against the first one now, around Verbove.
If you consider Russia to have FOUR lines of defense, Ukraine has breached the first of them.
So either Ukraine hasn’t breached a defense line yet but Russia only has two lines of defense north of Tokmak, or we consider Russia to have anywhere from four to seven lines of defense—with four lines, you can say Ukraine’s breached one line of defense. With the seven-line tabulation, Ukraine has breached two lines already.
For Ukraine pessimists, there’s a tendency to suggest Russia has SO MANY lines of defense and Ukraine hasn’t breached any of them. That is nonsense. It’s necessary to nail down what exactly a person considers a line of defense to determine, “How many does Russia have?” and, “Has Ukraine breached any?”
This is ignoring the fact Ukraine is within five miles of Russia’s only defense line south of Velyka Novosilka.
Here, an advance of just six to seven miles would mean Ukraine has broken through Russia’s vaunted defense line and is behind the line of defense.
“The approach of fall, when weather and fighting conditions are expected to worsen, gives Ukrainian forces a limited window to push forward.”
It should also be noted that the climate during mud season in southern Ukraine is much different from conditions in the north and east. The Black Sea climate renders the terrain in southern Ukraine far drier and less cold, with temperatures rarely dipping below freezing in many parts of southern Ukraine. Fall mud season is mild compared to the spring mud season in northern Ukraine, but it is even more so in the south.
There is a reason why Ukraine continued last year’s Kherson offensive right into November, even as the fall rains had already started in northern Ukraine and began to shift into early winter weather.
There will likely be a wetter, muddier period in the south from October to November. But such weather didn’t really stop the Kherson Offensive, and if Ukraine is pressing smaller-unit attritional attacks like it is now, it is unlikely to have that big of an impact—not like the way the mud can swallow tanks whole and bring entire armies to a standstill in the north.
While Ukraine punching through to Tokmak or breaking out south of Velyka Novosilka by late September would be ideal, today’s situation is not the ticking clock of doom that the CNN article appears to paint it as.