Dmitri over at War Translated posted the translation of a long Telegram post by Russian volunteer Murz, who helps support the Luhansk militia fundraising for supplies. Along with war criminal Igor Girkin, he is one of the fiercest internal critics of the Russian war effort, and this latest 5,000-word missive does not disappoint. Let’s dig in.
Let’s start with his take on Russian war propaganda.
We’ve laughed at how clumsy Russian propaganda can be, and here is one of their own pointing to how ridiculous it all is. It’s like Fox News and conservatives: People prefer to be told everything is okay, even if their eyes reveal the truth of the situation.
This is also a reminder that Russia, unable to win on the battlefield, has really invested a great deal into making winter as miserable as possible for not just Ukrainians, but for their European allies. Direct attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure have certainly made Ukraine’s life more difficult, but Europe is getting along just fine without Russian petroleum or natural gas. No matter how much Russian propaganda might claim otherwise, fact is that Russian oil exports have collapsed and Europe is opening up liquified natural gas terminals at breakneck speed, making Russian gas obsolete. As a result, this has been happening:
All the smoke and mirrors used to prop up the ruble and the Russian economy are less effective by the day.
But back to Murz. Next up is his analysis of how Russia is destroying its tanks by using them as long-range indirect fire (in other words, like artillery). When he talks about tanks firing from “closed positions,” he means well in the rear as opposed to maneuvering at the vanguard of an attack.
There’s a great deal of debate about whether Russia is running out of artillery shells. Indeed, Bakhmut’s defenders have noted a significant decrease in the intensity of the Russian barrages. Some speculate that Russia is hoarding ammo for a major new offensive. Others say that supplies are dwindling. Yet others say that it’s just Russia moving pieces across the battlefield, or that Russia is using this time to do maintenance on their guns, like replacing barrels.
Here Murz is saying that at least in the Donbas, Russian forces are so low on artillery shells that they’ve replaced them with tank shelling. The problem is those tanks aren’t designed to fire this much, with projectiles hurtled at far higher speeds (to pierce enemy armor) than artillery shells. That can work as a short-term Band-Aid, but it knocks those tanks out of commission when they actually, you know, need tanks. Maybe that’s why those Wagner troops are assaulting Ukrainian defensive positions around Bakhmut without any armor support.
Next up, Murz talks about how Ukraine is “duping” Russia into wasting lives around Donetsk city.
While Ukraine undoubtedly strikes infrastructure targets inside Donetsk city, this is what it looks like today:
The city has power, which could easily be cut as it’s well within range of Ukrainian artillery. Yet when it is struck, it’s the rail infrastructure, it’s the gas storage, it’s the ammo dumps and troop concentrations. Ukraine doesn’t have the munitions to waste on civilian targets, nor the inclination to do so even if it wanted. This propagandist claim is a reminder that Murz is a Russian nationalist true believer.
What is more interesting is how Murz sees Russia haplessly falling for Ukrainian traps. It is Ukraine with the battlefield initiative, not Russia, and it’s costing his home team. Not that he thinks Russia always needs to be tricked into slaughtering its own forces ...
What a turn of phrase! “The Russian military has an incredible talent for turning any village with a couple of landings and a pig farm into Verdun, on which their own, not enemy, units are ground.” If I ever get around to writing my book about Dovhen’ke, that sentence is making it to the jacket cover.
Next up, he laments the poor state of Russia’s communications, or more accurately, the lack of any. It’s why we don't see anything larger than (literally) a handful of troops assault any position at any given time. It is impossible to coordinate any such attacks without working radios.
I wrote about Pavlivka here, and about Ukraine’s defensive strategy at Bakhmut here. And I love the obvious sarcasm as he celebrates the capturing of some insignificant village as Russia loses entire regions on the other flank. You might remember how one pro-Russian Twitter account celebrated Wagner’s capture of a hill near Bakhmut, while Ukraine was at that very moment liberating almost the entirety of Kharkiv oblast.
Next up, Murz tackles the lack of unified Russian military presence.
This is a topic we’ve touched on before, and merits a deep dive. There is no unified Russian command. As Russian forces were thrown back in Kharkiv oblast, Russia’s ministry of defense begged Wagner (a “PMC,” or “private military contractor”) to move forces up and help stop the Ukrainian advance. Wagner CEO Yevgeny Prigozhin (also known as “Putin’s chef”) refused, bragging that his people were the only Russians anywhere on the front advancing. He was too busy feeding prison cannon fodder into the wood chipper around Bakhmut to give a rat’s ass about anyone else’s problems. He certainly doesn't buy into any grander strategy.
Then there’s the Rosgvardia—Putin’s private national guard—because god forbid the regular army get too big and dangerous and threaten Putin’s rule. They are traditionally used to suppress civilian uprisings in Russia, and in Ukraine they’ve mostly been seen around Kherson. Now, presumably they’re in Melitopol, Mariupol, and other occupied cities.
BARS are volunteer battalions of mobilized former military veterans. They’re the ones holding the line around Kreminna and Svatove, and by many indications are relatively competent. “Akhmad” I assume is a racist reference to Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen militias. After featuring heavily on TikTok early in the war, they seem to have mostly disappeared. Rumors are they are “barrier” troops, shooting any retreating Russian prisoners or mobilized fodder, but I’m not sure I buy it. Given we last truly saw them in Kherson, I suspect they’re also part of Russia’s defenses in Zaporizhzhia oblast, on the approaches to Tokmak, Melitopol, and Berdyansk. Kadyrov has been hot and cold on Russia’s Ministry of Defense, and seems to help when he feels like it or it’s in his interest.
At the start of the war, there wasn’t even a unified commander, with each axis of attack commanded by one of Russia’s military districts. As such, they all fought for resources, attention, and glory. That seems to have been solved not just by the appointment of a supreme commander (Sergey Surovikin), but by the elimination of all but one of those axes of attack. And yet still, even today, Russia’s units remain fragmented. Reports of them firing on each other are common, and if Murz is correct, it’s even worse than anyone thinks.
Moving on ...
Faberge egg.
This guy knows how to use words! I didn’t know Faberge, known for its delicate and breathtakingly expensive “imperial eggs” and jewelry, was a Russian company.
Thus Murz mocks the fragility of the defensive lines Russia is building all across its captured territories. Of the white concrete pyramids that make up part of those lines, he rolls his eyes, “God forbid the tank is scratched” as it punches through. He notes that rains have washed away the foundations of defensive emplacements. Meanwhile, he notes that Russia should’ve learned from Ukraine on how to properly defend.
Murz has made these accusations before, that Russia’s war effort is so catastrophically terrible that it can’t possibly be mere incompetence. He is convinced that treason is at the root, and that he continues to post unbothered by Russian authorities speaks to … something.
Wagner’s Prigozhin and Kadyrov have both attempted to blame Russia’s Ministry of Defense for their disastrous performance, yet Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu survives, lest Putin be forced to admit mistakes. The Ministry of Defense attempted to blame Russia’s SBU security services for bad intelligence heading into Ukraine, and the rumor is that it is them who are protecting ultra-nationalist critics of the war like Murz and Girkin—they shift the focus and blame back on the armed forces.
Next up, more on Russia’s problems with its artillery:
We’ve seen those lunar landscapes. Here is the outskirts of Dovhen’ke:
The fields outside Dovhen’ke.
Murz has a point. Every single one of those shells hit seedlings and crops and maybe some locusts, but … there wasn’t a single Ukrainian soldier, piece of equipment, or position anywhere out in the open like that. Ukrainians like to talk about Russia’s massive artillery advantage, but the vast majority is spray-and-pray, hitting nothing of value. Now, such volume means that eventually, something of value gets hit. Most injuries and deaths in this war come from artillery, not bullet wounds, and Ukraine has lost as many as 50,000 soldiers this war thus far. So none of this is meant to minimize the damage from Russian artillery. But just imagine, what if they were actually good at their craft?
“Pew pew pew hurray!” I’m dying. This guy is funny! “Shell hunger” is the direct translation of “ammunition shortage.” He keeps coming back to this, saying they’re running out.
And you know how Ukrainians have had great success using drones to drop grenades on Russian soldiers? Murz mocks Russian attempts to copy that strategy.
“Hohol” is the Russian slur for Ukrainian. Aside from multiple hateful slurs (because he is Russian after all), this is hilarious. Russian artillery desperately lacks eyes on the enemy. Well-meaning supporters crowdsource drones for these units, but instead of using them to adjust artillery fire, they want to do cool grenade drops just like their enemy does. But since they don’t know how to do it, they’ve just wasted that precious drone their families and supporters scrimped to buy.
I’m going to wrap up with his view on Russian infantry, even though his screed goes on and on.
Those defensive lines look imposing, and will certainly slow down any Ukrainian offensive. But the line is only as effective as its manned infantry defenders, and mechanized (armored) reserves in the rear, ready to respond to any Ukrainian breakthrough.
Also, give it a little time and those defensive lines may literally crumble into dust. That process has already begun.
You gotta love Russian corruption. But Murz doesn’t just criticize the workmanship of the defensive emplacements, but stresses the importance of trained defenders in those trenches. He’s totally right.
I was an artilleryman, fire direction for MLRS. My infantry knowledge is rudimentary at best. My son is an army infantryman, and I’ve paid attention to his training. Something as simple as preparing a defensive emplacement for a squad or platoon is a complex formula of firing points and logistical considerations. Here, go to page 5-30 of the Ranger handbook, which informs U.S. infantry skills, and check out the complexity of setting up a simple temporary perimeter defense. Every American officer learns this procedure, and every American NCO is drilled on it so that they can do it in their sleep. An effective fighting force learns these skills. NATO armies learn it. Russia never did.
At the same time, Ukraine has mastered the art of defense. Their “flexible defense” moves back and forth between layered trenches depending on the tactical situation. No reason to sit in forward positions under Russian artillery. They’re happy to retreat, allow Russian infantry to advance, then hit them as they extend past their protected positions, with stretched supply lines. Once the Russian advance is dealt with, Ukraine can return to their forward positions, ebbing and flowing like the tides. We’ve seen it time and time again this war, currently at Bakhmut.
Now imagine a mobilized Russian, with zero leadership or training, thrown into a trench and told to hold the line. Yes, he’ll be a speed bump that will need to be dealt with by any advancing Ukrainian force, but that’s about it.
Anyway, that was fun. The biggest takeaway? Murz didn’t say much we didn’t already know. It means that we’re not blinded by hopium and copium, but have a true, honest, and clear picture of Russia’s rank difficulties.
As for Murz, last I checked, his Livejournal had been taken down by Russia. So who knows, maybe he’s not so protected after all.
Looked up that law, it’s Russian.
Let’s start with his take on Russian war propaganda.
We’ve laughed at how clumsy Russian propaganda can be, and here is one of their own pointing to how ridiculous it all is. It’s like Fox News and conservatives: People prefer to be told everything is okay, even if their eyes reveal the truth of the situation.
This is also a reminder that Russia, unable to win on the battlefield, has really invested a great deal into making winter as miserable as possible for not just Ukrainians, but for their European allies. Direct attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure have certainly made Ukraine’s life more difficult, but Europe is getting along just fine without Russian petroleum or natural gas. No matter how much Russian propaganda might claim otherwise, fact is that Russian oil exports have collapsed and Europe is opening up liquified natural gas terminals at breakneck speed, making Russian gas obsolete. As a result, this has been happening:
All the smoke and mirrors used to prop up the ruble and the Russian economy are less effective by the day.
But back to Murz. Next up is his analysis of how Russia is destroying its tanks by using them as long-range indirect fire (in other words, like artillery). When he talks about tanks firing from “closed positions,” he means well in the rear as opposed to maneuvering at the vanguard of an attack.
There’s a great deal of debate about whether Russia is running out of artillery shells. Indeed, Bakhmut’s defenders have noted a significant decrease in the intensity of the Russian barrages. Some speculate that Russia is hoarding ammo for a major new offensive. Others say that supplies are dwindling. Yet others say that it’s just Russia moving pieces across the battlefield, or that Russia is using this time to do maintenance on their guns, like replacing barrels.
Here Murz is saying that at least in the Donbas, Russian forces are so low on artillery shells that they’ve replaced them with tank shelling. The problem is those tanks aren’t designed to fire this much, with projectiles hurtled at far higher speeds (to pierce enemy armor) than artillery shells. That can work as a short-term Band-Aid, but it knocks those tanks out of commission when they actually, you know, need tanks. Maybe that’s why those Wagner troops are assaulting Ukrainian defensive positions around Bakhmut without any armor support.
Next up, Murz talks about how Ukraine is “duping” Russia into wasting lives around Donetsk city.
While Ukraine undoubtedly strikes infrastructure targets inside Donetsk city, this is what it looks like today:
The city has power, which could easily be cut as it’s well within range of Ukrainian artillery. Yet when it is struck, it’s the rail infrastructure, it’s the gas storage, it’s the ammo dumps and troop concentrations. Ukraine doesn’t have the munitions to waste on civilian targets, nor the inclination to do so even if it wanted. This propagandist claim is a reminder that Murz is a Russian nationalist true believer.
What is more interesting is how Murz sees Russia haplessly falling for Ukrainian traps. It is Ukraine with the battlefield initiative, not Russia, and it’s costing his home team. Not that he thinks Russia always needs to be tricked into slaughtering its own forces ...
What a turn of phrase! “The Russian military has an incredible talent for turning any village with a couple of landings and a pig farm into Verdun, on which their own, not enemy, units are ground.” If I ever get around to writing my book about Dovhen’ke, that sentence is making it to the jacket cover.
Next up, he laments the poor state of Russia’s communications, or more accurately, the lack of any. It’s why we don't see anything larger than (literally) a handful of troops assault any position at any given time. It is impossible to coordinate any such attacks without working radios.
I wrote about Pavlivka here, and about Ukraine’s defensive strategy at Bakhmut here. And I love the obvious sarcasm as he celebrates the capturing of some insignificant village as Russia loses entire regions on the other flank. You might remember how one pro-Russian Twitter account celebrated Wagner’s capture of a hill near Bakhmut, while Ukraine was at that very moment liberating almost the entirety of Kharkiv oblast.
Next up, Murz tackles the lack of unified Russian military presence.
This is a topic we’ve touched on before, and merits a deep dive. There is no unified Russian command. As Russian forces were thrown back in Kharkiv oblast, Russia’s ministry of defense begged Wagner (a “PMC,” or “private military contractor”) to move forces up and help stop the Ukrainian advance. Wagner CEO Yevgeny Prigozhin (also known as “Putin’s chef”) refused, bragging that his people were the only Russians anywhere on the front advancing. He was too busy feeding prison cannon fodder into the wood chipper around Bakhmut to give a rat’s ass about anyone else’s problems. He certainly doesn't buy into any grander strategy.
Then there’s the Rosgvardia—Putin’s private national guard—because god forbid the regular army get too big and dangerous and threaten Putin’s rule. They are traditionally used to suppress civilian uprisings in Russia, and in Ukraine they’ve mostly been seen around Kherson. Now, presumably they’re in Melitopol, Mariupol, and other occupied cities.
BARS are volunteer battalions of mobilized former military veterans. They’re the ones holding the line around Kreminna and Svatove, and by many indications are relatively competent. “Akhmad” I assume is a racist reference to Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen militias. After featuring heavily on TikTok early in the war, they seem to have mostly disappeared. Rumors are they are “barrier” troops, shooting any retreating Russian prisoners or mobilized fodder, but I’m not sure I buy it. Given we last truly saw them in Kherson, I suspect they’re also part of Russia’s defenses in Zaporizhzhia oblast, on the approaches to Tokmak, Melitopol, and Berdyansk. Kadyrov has been hot and cold on Russia’s Ministry of Defense, and seems to help when he feels like it or it’s in his interest.
At the start of the war, there wasn’t even a unified commander, with each axis of attack commanded by one of Russia’s military districts. As such, they all fought for resources, attention, and glory. That seems to have been solved not just by the appointment of a supreme commander (Sergey Surovikin), but by the elimination of all but one of those axes of attack. And yet still, even today, Russia’s units remain fragmented. Reports of them firing on each other are common, and if Murz is correct, it’s even worse than anyone thinks.
Moving on ...
Faberge egg.
This guy knows how to use words! I didn’t know Faberge, known for its delicate and breathtakingly expensive “imperial eggs” and jewelry, was a Russian company.
Thus Murz mocks the fragility of the defensive lines Russia is building all across its captured territories. Of the white concrete pyramids that make up part of those lines, he rolls his eyes, “God forbid the tank is scratched” as it punches through. He notes that rains have washed away the foundations of defensive emplacements. Meanwhile, he notes that Russia should’ve learned from Ukraine on how to properly defend.
Murz has made these accusations before, that Russia’s war effort is so catastrophically terrible that it can’t possibly be mere incompetence. He is convinced that treason is at the root, and that he continues to post unbothered by Russian authorities speaks to … something.
Wagner’s Prigozhin and Kadyrov have both attempted to blame Russia’s Ministry of Defense for their disastrous performance, yet Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu survives, lest Putin be forced to admit mistakes. The Ministry of Defense attempted to blame Russia’s SBU security services for bad intelligence heading into Ukraine, and the rumor is that it is them who are protecting ultra-nationalist critics of the war like Murz and Girkin—they shift the focus and blame back on the armed forces.
Next up, more on Russia’s problems with its artillery:
We’ve seen those lunar landscapes. Here is the outskirts of Dovhen’ke:
The fields outside Dovhen’ke.
Murz has a point. Every single one of those shells hit seedlings and crops and maybe some locusts, but … there wasn’t a single Ukrainian soldier, piece of equipment, or position anywhere out in the open like that. Ukrainians like to talk about Russia’s massive artillery advantage, but the vast majority is spray-and-pray, hitting nothing of value. Now, such volume means that eventually, something of value gets hit. Most injuries and deaths in this war come from artillery, not bullet wounds, and Ukraine has lost as many as 50,000 soldiers this war thus far. So none of this is meant to minimize the damage from Russian artillery. But just imagine, what if they were actually good at their craft?
“Pew pew pew hurray!” I’m dying. This guy is funny! “Shell hunger” is the direct translation of “ammunition shortage.” He keeps coming back to this, saying they’re running out.
And you know how Ukrainians have had great success using drones to drop grenades on Russian soldiers? Murz mocks Russian attempts to copy that strategy.
“Hohol” is the Russian slur for Ukrainian. Aside from multiple hateful slurs (because he is Russian after all), this is hilarious. Russian artillery desperately lacks eyes on the enemy. Well-meaning supporters crowdsource drones for these units, but instead of using them to adjust artillery fire, they want to do cool grenade drops just like their enemy does. But since they don’t know how to do it, they’ve just wasted that precious drone their families and supporters scrimped to buy.
I’m going to wrap up with his view on Russian infantry, even though his screed goes on and on.
Those defensive lines look imposing, and will certainly slow down any Ukrainian offensive. But the line is only as effective as its manned infantry defenders, and mechanized (armored) reserves in the rear, ready to respond to any Ukrainian breakthrough.
Also, give it a little time and those defensive lines may literally crumble into dust. That process has already begun.
You gotta love Russian corruption. But Murz doesn’t just criticize the workmanship of the defensive emplacements, but stresses the importance of trained defenders in those trenches. He’s totally right.
I was an artilleryman, fire direction for MLRS. My infantry knowledge is rudimentary at best. My son is an army infantryman, and I’ve paid attention to his training. Something as simple as preparing a defensive emplacement for a squad or platoon is a complex formula of firing points and logistical considerations. Here, go to page 5-30 of the Ranger handbook, which informs U.S. infantry skills, and check out the complexity of setting up a simple temporary perimeter defense. Every American officer learns this procedure, and every American NCO is drilled on it so that they can do it in their sleep. An effective fighting force learns these skills. NATO armies learn it. Russia never did.
At the same time, Ukraine has mastered the art of defense. Their “flexible defense” moves back and forth between layered trenches depending on the tactical situation. No reason to sit in forward positions under Russian artillery. They’re happy to retreat, allow Russian infantry to advance, then hit them as they extend past their protected positions, with stretched supply lines. Once the Russian advance is dealt with, Ukraine can return to their forward positions, ebbing and flowing like the tides. We’ve seen it time and time again this war, currently at Bakhmut.
Now imagine a mobilized Russian, with zero leadership or training, thrown into a trench and told to hold the line. Yes, he’ll be a speed bump that will need to be dealt with by any advancing Ukrainian force, but that’s about it.
Anyway, that was fun. The biggest takeaway? Murz didn’t say much we didn’t already know. It means that we’re not blinded by hopium and copium, but have a true, honest, and clear picture of Russia’s rank difficulties.
As for Murz, last I checked, his Livejournal had been taken down by Russia. So who knows, maybe he’s not so protected after all.
Looked up that law, it’s Russian.