UPDATE: Saturday, Jun 24, 2023 · 5:51:56 PM +00:00 · Jessica Sutherland
Multiple reports are emerging of Prigozhin’s announcement that he’s called things off:
UPDATE: Saturday, Jun 24, 2023 · 5:00:52 PM +00:00 · Jessica Sutherland
via Daily Kos’ Mark Sumner:
UPDATE: Saturday, Jun 24, 2023 · 3:56:52 PM +00:00 · RO37
The New Voice of Ukraine reports that Ukrainian intelligence and flight radar data suggest Putin may have fled Moscow. The Russian government denies the report.
UPDATE: Saturday, Jun 24, 2023 · 3:23:25 PM +00:00 · RO37
Russians sources report on further advances by Wagner towards Moscow.
Russian National Guard troops are reportedly preparing to defend Moscow.
Wagner Forces may have control of nuclear warheads.
Road closures reported throughout Wagner’s route of advance on google maps.
A good reminder from @War_Mapper
As the result of a catastrophic political blunder by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Second Russian Civil War appears to have started.
Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group, has launched what can be described as a coup d’etat with an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 of his Wagner mercenaries. As a first step, the Wagner troops appear to have captured the city of Rostov-on-Don, and may have cut Russian supply lines to the southern front in the process.
Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner Group also may have just taken Russia’s armies in Crimea, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions hostage. RELATED STORY: Explainer: Mercenary army moves toward Moscow; what is the Wagner Group? Who is Prigozhin?
The first city that the Wagnerites moved to secure in their apparent coup is the city of Rostov-on-Don. The 10th largest city in all of Russia, it is a significant hub of transport and commerce.
Wagner armored vehicles driving through the streets of Rostov-on-Don on Friday
Rostov-on-Don also happens to link Russia’s supply line to Crimea and the Southern Front around the Tokmak area, where some of the most intense fighting in Russia’s war on Ukraine is currently taking place. It also is home to the headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District, which oversees many of the primary units currently engaged in fighting in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
There are rumors that Wagner forces are on the march for Moscow, and are already about 500km to the south.
Russian Rail Information obtained from maps created by Pavel Kashin (www-personal.umich.edu/...)
Who is Prigozhin and Wagner Group?
Yevgeny Prigozhin is an ex-caterer for Putin who used his connection with the Russian president to found the Wagner Group. Originally founded in 2014, the Wagner Group was nominally a private band of mercenaries but began making appearances on behalf of Russian state interests. From 2014 to 2021, Wagner troops have appeared in various conflict zones, such as Ukraine (in Crimea and Donbas), Syria, Sudan, the Central African Republic,
As an entity believed to be funded and largely equipped by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Wagner Group was always closely linked to the Russian government, acting as a de facto alternative military organization. The group has been referred to as “Putin’s private army” and Russia’s “implausible deniability.” As a nominally private company, the Russian government can deny that it has directed Wagner to intervene in various conflicts, even though it very obviously had done so (hence ‘implausible deniability’).
Beginning with just a few hundred members in 2014, Wagner had grown into 6000-strong forces by 2017, but remained a force no larger than several thousand soldiers—until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Prisoner Recruitment and the Growth of Wagner
Wagner’s dramatic expansion likely grew out of Putin’s discontent with his own Ministry of Defense. Documents captured in March 2022 indicated that initial Russian plans anticipated the completion of all military operations in Ukraine within 15 days, achieving control of all of Ukraine’s major ports, cities, and capital. To say this operational plan by the Russian Ministry of Defense was overly optimistic would be an understatement.
First, Russia was defeated in the critical Battle of Kyiv (February to April 2022) and forced to withdraw from its attempt to capture the Ukrainian capital. Next, Russian forces tried to capture all of Donbas, but suffered horrendous casualties—capturing only the twin cities of Seveodontesk and Lysychansk by late August.
As further humiliations through the Kharkiv counteroffensive and the liberation of Kherson played out from September to November 2022, Wagner Group was given authorization to radically expand from around 6,000 to almost 40,000~50,000 troops by December 2022.
This massive recruitment drive was largely driven by Wagner's recruitment of prison inmates. Wagner was permitted to enter into prisons and offer pardons to anyone who completed a six-month term of service with Wagner Group at the front.
Prigozhin himself was taped recruiting prisoners to Wagner.
With these inmate forces, Wagner became known for their brutal tactics in the Battle of Bakhmut, sending thousands of convict soldiers to their deaths in near-suicidally aggressive attacks. These costly tactics would gradually push Wagner closer and closer to capturing the city of Bakhmut from October 2022 to May 2023.
Prigozhin established himself in the Russian psyche, through frequent appearances on the social network service Telegram, where he would often provide lengthy monologues explaining his views on the Rwar.
Many of Wagner Group’s soldiers have been killed, wounded, and unable to return to action, or have been sent home with their contracts complete. Wagner Group is currently believed to be composed of around 8,000-10,000 professional contract soldiers, and another 15,000-plus convict soldiers.
Wagner’s Role as a Semi-independent Military Organization
Notably, Wagner is just one of several semi-independent military organizations in Russia. Aside from the Russian regular Army, the Kadyrovites (Chechnyan Regiment), the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya), VDV (Russian Paratroopers), and Spetznaz (Russian Special Forces) all feature semi-independent commands in varying degrees.
Putin has been loath to place too large a portion of the Russian Army under a single command, famously declining to appoint an overall commander for the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with independent commanders taking charge of as many as five different command sectors with overlapping responsibilities.
Even after appointing a nominal overall commander of the Ukraine conflict, the Wagner Group and the Kadyrovites in particular continued to defy orders from the Ministry of Defense and operate as de facto independent commands.
The Russian dual military structure—that is, an official army and unofficial military forces—is broadly similar to Nazi Germany’s Waffen-SS and German Army. Adolf Hitler needed a military to realize his ambitions, but distrusted army officers and thus wanted a counterweight to the army’s monopoly of military force. Hitler created the Waffen-SS, originally the paramilitary arm of Hitler’s bodyguards, the SS—then expanded it into a 900,000-strong army.
The Waffen-SS developed into a full-blown military force, with its command structure and officers separate from the German Army. The Waffen-SS had a fierce rivalry with the regular Army, which Hitler saw as beneficial: So long as the two military arms did not cooperate with each other, it would be difficult to conduct a coup to overthrow him.
Putin’s permissiveness of fierce criticism of the Ministry of Defense from Prigozhin and Wagner Group, as well as the cultivation of a fierce rivalry between the two organizations may have been designed to keep the military of Russia divided to prevent a coup.
If that was the case, Putin’s political machinations have backfired spectacularly.
Wagner and the Ministry of Defense’s Conflict Accelerates
While Wagner appeared to remain in Putin’s favor from September 2022-January 2023, in mid-January, Putin made a sudden about-face.
Putin appointed as overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, Sergei Surovikin, a known Wagner ally, on Oct. 8. He was the first man appointed as an overall commander for Russia.
However, just three months later, Putin effectively demoted Surovikin by appointing Wagner's enemy and the Ministry of Defense's old guard Valery Gerasimov as the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. Gerasimov followed his appointment by making a series of moves intended to reduce Wagner’s ability to grow, or to even maintain its numbers. Most importantly, Russia barred Wagner from recruitment of convicts, and established its own private companies under closer Ministry of Defense control to take over inmate recruitment.
Soon, Prigozhin began loudly and repeatedly accusing the Ministry of Defense of depriving the Wagner soldiers of necessary artillery shells. Prigozhin frequently claimed, in virulent and profane rants posted publicly to social media, that Wagner soldiers' deaths were being caused by the machinations of Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Commander in Chief Gerasimov.
In early May, as Wagner began concentrating its remaining forces within the city limits of Bakhmut for a final push to capture the city, it began handing off positions on the northern and southern flanks outside the city limits to Russian regular army units. These handoffs turned into a fiasco, as Wagner and Russian army units refused to communicate with each other. Ukrainian troops began taking advantage of the confusion, advancing after the handoffs.
Prigozhin condemned the Ministry of Defense for losing positions paid for by Wagnerite blood out of cowardice.
On May 4, Prigozhin dropped a further bombshell stating that Wagner forces would withdraw from Bakhmut unless the Ministry of Defense agreed to send more artillery shells to support the Wagner Offensive in Bakhmut by May 10th. Prigozhin declared victory, saying Wagner was promised additional unspecified ammunition a few days later.
On May 22, Wagner Group declared that it had captured the city of Bakhmut. Prigozhin began stating that Wagner troops would exit the city, and their positions would be taken over by Russian regular Army units.
Even after the victory declaration, Wagner and the regular Army’s relationship appeared to deteriorate further, as Russian Army positions on Bakhmut’s flanks lost ground to local Ukrainian counterattacks.
On June 8, a shocking video was released by Wagner forces. The video was a “confession tape” of Lt. Col. Roman Venevitin, commander of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Russian Army. Lt. Col. Venevitin appeared to have a broken nose in the video, and stated that, out of a sense of personal animosity and while drunk with alcohol, he had personally fired upon Wagner vehicles, among other offenses. Lt. Col. Venevitin later stated he had been tortured into confessing by Wagnerites. Wagner Group and Prigozhin appeared to face no direct consequences for this violent episode.
The situation further deteriorated as Shoigu demanded, with Putin’s express backing, a requirement that all contract soldiers sign a contract directly with the Ministry of Defense. The signing of such a contract, it was pointed out, would make all Wagner soldiers the legal direct employees of the Ministry of Defense. Prigozhin vowed that Wagner's troops would never sign such a contract. A deadline was set for Wagner troops to sign the contract by July 1.
Wagner troops appeared to have fully withdrawn from Bakhmut’s frontal positions by mid-June, accompanied by some reports that former Wagner soldiers were beginning to return home.
The Coup
On June 23 at 9:09 PM local time, Prigozhin, in a public video posted on Telegram, announced that the Ministry of Defense had launched rocket attacks on Wagner camps; he claimed a huge number of Wagner soldiers had been killed.
This was followed shortly by a second video where Prigozhin declared that Wagner’s supreme council had decided that the Russian military leadership must be stopped, and that Wagner’s 25,000 remaining soldiers would do it. Prigozhin further stated that anyone who resists Wagner would be killed, referring to the Wagner uprising as a “march for justice.”
Several further videos followed, arguing that the Russian Ministry of Defense was trying to destroy Wagner, and that they were working to hide the extent of Russian losses from her people. At 9:49 PM local time—just 40 minutes after his first video—Prigozhin called on the Russian people to join him in fighting the evil that is the military leadership of Russia.
Meanwhile, Wagner forces were reportedly crossing the border from eastern Ukraine into Russia. A key logistical juncture through which all railroad traffic from central Russia passes through to get to southwestern Russia, it is also the location of the headquarters of the Southern District of the Russian Army.
The loss of the city by Russian forces would deprive Russian troops in Southern Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula of their lines of supply.
Click image to enlarge
By mid-morning on Saturday, Russian forces had entered the city of Rostov-on-Don and began encircling the Southern District headquarters.
Shortly thereafter, Wagner forces entered the headquarters; Prigozhin was filmed accompanied by Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.
But the Wagner forces were not content with capturing Rostov-on-Don, and were soon on the move again.
What is alleged to be a lengthy column of Wagner vehicles traveled north along the M4 highway north toward Voronezh.
Click to enlarge
There are videos and reports of Russian troops dropping their weapons and refusing to fight Wagner troops, along with unconfirmed reports that Voronezh is now also under Wagner control, This would put Wagner just 500km south of Moscow—what would ordinarily be a six-hour drive.
Putin’s regime has reportedly mobilized troops around Moscow.
Putin soon addressed the nation, declaring his intention to fight and destroy this uprising. Putin called the Wagner Group criminals, and promised that all who participated would be punished.
Developments remain ongoing.
Analysis
This coup represents a massive political miscalculation by Putin, which allowed a desperate Prigozhin to move against the military and the government.
One key question: Why are Wagner troops going along with Prigozhin? From the perspective of the Wagner soldiers, many have spent months fighting in the brutal trenches of Bakhmut, all the while they were being told that their comrades were dying because the Ministry of Defense was withholding shells.
Although the Ministry of Defense denied the claim, Putin did … nothing.
The Russian state’s primary power of control rests in its power to shape narratives through the control of information. Unlike the Soviet police state, which used raw power and the threat of violence to keep dissidents in line, the Russian state’s FSB (Federal Security Service) is feared—but it’s a fraction of the size of its predecessor, the KGB. Putin’s Russia instead relies on its control over the Russian media landscape to shape most people's understanding of their lived realities.
However, in the case of Prigozhin, perhaps because Wagner was being set up as a competing counterweight to the Ministry of Defense, so long as Prigozhin avoided directly criticizing Putin himself, his virulent denunciations of the Ministry of Defense went unchallenged by state media.
This gave credibility to Prigozhin’s claims of the Ministry of Defense’s corruption and incompetence, which likely resonated particularly strongly with the soldiers in his command.
Brazen acts of defiance of the Ministry of Defense, like the kidnapping and torture of Lt. Col. Venevitin, likely gave Wagner troops confidence that Prigozhin was more powerful than the Ministry, and had Putin’s tacit approval in these actions.
Then it appeared that Wagner had reached its final act: Wagner was being all but disbanded, having served its purpose in capturing Bakhmut. The remaining soldiers were being contracted to the Ministry of Defense, and Prigozhin was essentially being told to submit, or be removed, with an ultimatum to expire on July 1.
But Putin’s second miscalculation was to do this when 25,000 Wagner troops were pulled off the front lines and had freedom of movement.
It’s not entirely clear exactly how much military power Putin even has at his immediate disposal.
Reference this May 20, 2023, Defense Intelligence Memorandum from the United Kingdom.
A few weeks before the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Ukraine began a series of local counterattacks in Bakhmut that threatened the flanks of the Russian positions north and south of the city. Losing ground, Russia rushed reinforcements to Bakhmut.
The UK report notes that Russia “redeployed up to several battalions to reinforce the Bakhmut sector.” Furthermore, it notes “Russia likely maintain(s) relatively few uncommitted combat units in Ukraine, the redeployment represents a notable commitment by Russian command.”
These statements give some hints as to the scope of Russian reserves, based on UK intelligence estimates.
At the time, Russia appeared to commit five to six additional battalions in the Bakhmut sector. If five or six battalions are a “notable commitment,” it might be reasonable to assume that they represent at least 15-20% of Russian reserves. A commitment of just 10% or fewer Russian reserves would seem odd to characterize as “notable.”
On that basis, Russia has, at most, 30-40 Battalions of strategic reserves in the entire Ukrainian theater of operations. Perhaps 50. A Russian battalion is generally around 600-800 troops, so this would represent around 20,000-35,000 troops.
And thus Russia’s entire strategic reserve in the Ukrainian battlefield may represent approximately similar or fewer troops than Prigozhin has at his disposal: allegedly 25,000.
Furthermore, Russia has been steadily denuding its army formations within Russia to strengthen its combat forces in Ukraine. Most of the elite reserve forces intended to block an attack by NATO, like the 1st Guards Tank Army, have long since been committed to Ukraine—and largely devastated. A Feb. 15 report from the UK Ministry of Defense suggested that 97% of Russia’s combat forces were committed within Ukraine.
Supporting the idea that Russian defenses in its mainland are virtually nonexistent, Freedom of Russia Legion troops—that claimed to be of battalion size (at most several hundred troops)—seemingly crossed the Russo-Ukrainian border freely, to raid Russian villages in Belgorod. One raid, that started on June 4, managed to hold the village of Novaya Tavolzhanka until around June 15. The fact that a lightly armed group of infantry could not only freely cross the border virtually at will, but maintain a position within Russia for over a week indicates the weakness of any forces available for Russia near the borders.
Moscow may be significantly better defended than the bordering regions. However, the general assumption that Russian troops should be able to crush the 25,000 Wagnerites with ease does not seem supported by evidence.
This is not to say that Wagner forces will capture Moscow, or that they will succeed in their attempt to decapitate the military. But, in my opinion, it is not at all clear that Putin has the forces necessary to crush Wagner’s attempted coup, particularly in a short period.
Wagner forces appear to have fully cut Russian lines of supply to the Russian armies in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimean Oblasts. If it takes weeks for the Russians to suppress the Wagner uprising, the Russian army’s defensive positions in southern Ukraine may collapse from a lack of supply.
I can’t think of a better way to put this than this comment from a stellar Putin parody account.
Multiple reports are emerging of Prigozhin’s announcement that he’s called things off:
UPDATE: Saturday, Jun 24, 2023 · 5:00:52 PM +00:00 · Jessica Sutherland
via Daily Kos’ Mark Sumner:
UPDATE: Saturday, Jun 24, 2023 · 3:56:52 PM +00:00 · RO37
The New Voice of Ukraine reports that Ukrainian intelligence and flight radar data suggest Putin may have fled Moscow. The Russian government denies the report.
UPDATE: Saturday, Jun 24, 2023 · 3:23:25 PM +00:00 · RO37
Russians sources report on further advances by Wagner towards Moscow.
Russian National Guard troops are reportedly preparing to defend Moscow.
Russian National Guard units are lying next to the Kashira highway on the approaches of Moscow. Waiting for Wagner units to arrive. pic.twitter.com/mbu21A4ecm
— NOELREPORTS
(@NOELreports) June 24, 2023
Wagner Forces may have control of nuclear warheads.
Road closures reported throughout Wagner’s route of advance on google maps.
A good reminder from @War_Mapper
As the result of a catastrophic political blunder by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Second Russian Civil War appears to have started.
Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group, has launched what can be described as a coup d’etat with an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 of his Wagner mercenaries. As a first step, the Wagner troops appear to have captured the city of Rostov-on-Don, and may have cut Russian supply lines to the southern front in the process.
Yevgeny Prigozhin and Wagner Group also may have just taken Russia’s armies in Crimea, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions hostage. RELATED STORY: Explainer: Mercenary army moves toward Moscow; what is the Wagner Group? Who is Prigozhin?
The first city that the Wagnerites moved to secure in their apparent coup is the city of Rostov-on-Don. The 10th largest city in all of Russia, it is a significant hub of transport and commerce.
Wagner armored vehicles driving through the streets of Rostov-on-Don on Friday
Rostov-on-Don also happens to link Russia’s supply line to Crimea and the Southern Front around the Tokmak area, where some of the most intense fighting in Russia’s war on Ukraine is currently taking place. It also is home to the headquarters of Russia’s Southern Military District, which oversees many of the primary units currently engaged in fighting in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
There are rumors that Wagner forces are on the march for Moscow, and are already about 500km to the south.
Russian Rail Information obtained from maps created by Pavel Kashin (www-personal.umich.edu/...)
Who is Prigozhin and Wagner Group?
Yevgeny Prigozhin is an ex-caterer for Putin who used his connection with the Russian president to found the Wagner Group. Originally founded in 2014, the Wagner Group was nominally a private band of mercenaries but began making appearances on behalf of Russian state interests. From 2014 to 2021, Wagner troops have appeared in various conflict zones, such as Ukraine (in Crimea and Donbas), Syria, Sudan, the Central African Republic,
As an entity believed to be funded and largely equipped by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Wagner Group was always closely linked to the Russian government, acting as a de facto alternative military organization. The group has been referred to as “Putin’s private army” and Russia’s “implausible deniability.” As a nominally private company, the Russian government can deny that it has directed Wagner to intervene in various conflicts, even though it very obviously had done so (hence ‘implausible deniability’).
Beginning with just a few hundred members in 2014, Wagner had grown into 6000-strong forces by 2017, but remained a force no larger than several thousand soldiers—until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Prisoner Recruitment and the Growth of Wagner
Wagner’s dramatic expansion likely grew out of Putin’s discontent with his own Ministry of Defense. Documents captured in March 2022 indicated that initial Russian plans anticipated the completion of all military operations in Ukraine within 15 days, achieving control of all of Ukraine’s major ports, cities, and capital. To say this operational plan by the Russian Ministry of Defense was overly optimistic would be an understatement.
First, Russia was defeated in the critical Battle of Kyiv (February to April 2022) and forced to withdraw from its attempt to capture the Ukrainian capital. Next, Russian forces tried to capture all of Donbas, but suffered horrendous casualties—capturing only the twin cities of Seveodontesk and Lysychansk by late August.
As further humiliations through the Kharkiv counteroffensive and the liberation of Kherson played out from September to November 2022, Wagner Group was given authorization to radically expand from around 6,000 to almost 40,000~50,000 troops by December 2022.
This massive recruitment drive was largely driven by Wagner's recruitment of prison inmates. Wagner was permitted to enter into prisons and offer pardons to anyone who completed a six-month term of service with Wagner Group at the front.
Prigozhin himself was taped recruiting prisoners to Wagner.
With these inmate forces, Wagner became known for their brutal tactics in the Battle of Bakhmut, sending thousands of convict soldiers to their deaths in near-suicidally aggressive attacks. These costly tactics would gradually push Wagner closer and closer to capturing the city of Bakhmut from October 2022 to May 2023.
Prigozhin established himself in the Russian psyche, through frequent appearances on the social network service Telegram, where he would often provide lengthy monologues explaining his views on the Rwar.
Many of Wagner Group’s soldiers have been killed, wounded, and unable to return to action, or have been sent home with their contracts complete. Wagner Group is currently believed to be composed of around 8,000-10,000 professional contract soldiers, and another 15,000-plus convict soldiers.
Wagner’s Role as a Semi-independent Military Organization
Notably, Wagner is just one of several semi-independent military organizations in Russia. Aside from the Russian regular Army, the Kadyrovites (Chechnyan Regiment), the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya), VDV (Russian Paratroopers), and Spetznaz (Russian Special Forces) all feature semi-independent commands in varying degrees.
Putin has been loath to place too large a portion of the Russian Army under a single command, famously declining to appoint an overall commander for the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with independent commanders taking charge of as many as five different command sectors with overlapping responsibilities.
Even after appointing a nominal overall commander of the Ukraine conflict, the Wagner Group and the Kadyrovites in particular continued to defy orders from the Ministry of Defense and operate as de facto independent commands.
The Russian dual military structure—that is, an official army and unofficial military forces—is broadly similar to Nazi Germany’s Waffen-SS and German Army. Adolf Hitler needed a military to realize his ambitions, but distrusted army officers and thus wanted a counterweight to the army’s monopoly of military force. Hitler created the Waffen-SS, originally the paramilitary arm of Hitler’s bodyguards, the SS—then expanded it into a 900,000-strong army.
The Waffen-SS developed into a full-blown military force, with its command structure and officers separate from the German Army. The Waffen-SS had a fierce rivalry with the regular Army, which Hitler saw as beneficial: So long as the two military arms did not cooperate with each other, it would be difficult to conduct a coup to overthrow him.
Putin’s permissiveness of fierce criticism of the Ministry of Defense from Prigozhin and Wagner Group, as well as the cultivation of a fierce rivalry between the two organizations may have been designed to keep the military of Russia divided to prevent a coup.
If that was the case, Putin’s political machinations have backfired spectacularly.
Wagner and the Ministry of Defense’s Conflict Accelerates
While Wagner appeared to remain in Putin’s favor from September 2022-January 2023, in mid-January, Putin made a sudden about-face.
Putin appointed as overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, Sergei Surovikin, a known Wagner ally, on Oct. 8. He was the first man appointed as an overall commander for Russia.
However, just three months later, Putin effectively demoted Surovikin by appointing Wagner's enemy and the Ministry of Defense's old guard Valery Gerasimov as the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine. Gerasimov followed his appointment by making a series of moves intended to reduce Wagner’s ability to grow, or to even maintain its numbers. Most importantly, Russia barred Wagner from recruitment of convicts, and established its own private companies under closer Ministry of Defense control to take over inmate recruitment.
Soon, Prigozhin began loudly and repeatedly accusing the Ministry of Defense of depriving the Wagner soldiers of necessary artillery shells. Prigozhin frequently claimed, in virulent and profane rants posted publicly to social media, that Wagner soldiers' deaths were being caused by the machinations of Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Commander in Chief Gerasimov.
In early May, as Wagner began concentrating its remaining forces within the city limits of Bakhmut for a final push to capture the city, it began handing off positions on the northern and southern flanks outside the city limits to Russian regular army units. These handoffs turned into a fiasco, as Wagner and Russian army units refused to communicate with each other. Ukrainian troops began taking advantage of the confusion, advancing after the handoffs.
Prigozhin condemned the Ministry of Defense for losing positions paid for by Wagnerite blood out of cowardice.
On May 4, Prigozhin dropped a further bombshell stating that Wagner forces would withdraw from Bakhmut unless the Ministry of Defense agreed to send more artillery shells to support the Wagner Offensive in Bakhmut by May 10th. Prigozhin declared victory, saying Wagner was promised additional unspecified ammunition a few days later.
On May 22, Wagner Group declared that it had captured the city of Bakhmut. Prigozhin began stating that Wagner troops would exit the city, and their positions would be taken over by Russian regular Army units.
Even after the victory declaration, Wagner and the regular Army’s relationship appeared to deteriorate further, as Russian Army positions on Bakhmut’s flanks lost ground to local Ukrainian counterattacks.
On June 8, a shocking video was released by Wagner forces. The video was a “confession tape” of Lt. Col. Roman Venevitin, commander of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Russian Army. Lt. Col. Venevitin appeared to have a broken nose in the video, and stated that, out of a sense of personal animosity and while drunk with alcohol, he had personally fired upon Wagner vehicles, among other offenses. Lt. Col. Venevitin later stated he had been tortured into confessing by Wagnerites. Wagner Group and Prigozhin appeared to face no direct consequences for this violent episode.
The situation further deteriorated as Shoigu demanded, with Putin’s express backing, a requirement that all contract soldiers sign a contract directly with the Ministry of Defense. The signing of such a contract, it was pointed out, would make all Wagner soldiers the legal direct employees of the Ministry of Defense. Prigozhin vowed that Wagner's troops would never sign such a contract. A deadline was set for Wagner troops to sign the contract by July 1.
Wagner troops appeared to have fully withdrawn from Bakhmut’s frontal positions by mid-June, accompanied by some reports that former Wagner soldiers were beginning to return home.
The Coup
On June 23 at 9:09 PM local time, Prigozhin, in a public video posted on Telegram, announced that the Ministry of Defense had launched rocket attacks on Wagner camps; he claimed a huge number of Wagner soldiers had been killed.
This was followed shortly by a second video where Prigozhin declared that Wagner’s supreme council had decided that the Russian military leadership must be stopped, and that Wagner’s 25,000 remaining soldiers would do it. Prigozhin further stated that anyone who resists Wagner would be killed, referring to the Wagner uprising as a “march for justice.”
Several further videos followed, arguing that the Russian Ministry of Defense was trying to destroy Wagner, and that they were working to hide the extent of Russian losses from her people. At 9:49 PM local time—just 40 minutes after his first video—Prigozhin called on the Russian people to join him in fighting the evil that is the military leadership of Russia.
Meanwhile, Wagner forces were reportedly crossing the border from eastern Ukraine into Russia. A key logistical juncture through which all railroad traffic from central Russia passes through to get to southwestern Russia, it is also the location of the headquarters of the Southern District of the Russian Army.
The loss of the city by Russian forces would deprive Russian troops in Southern Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula of their lines of supply.
Click image to enlarge
By mid-morning on Saturday, Russian forces had entered the city of Rostov-on-Don and began encircling the Southern District headquarters.
Shortly thereafter, Wagner forces entered the headquarters; Prigozhin was filmed accompanied by Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov.
But the Wagner forces were not content with capturing Rostov-on-Don, and were soon on the move again.
What is alleged to be a lengthy column of Wagner vehicles traveled north along the M4 highway north toward Voronezh.
Click to enlarge
There are videos and reports of Russian troops dropping their weapons and refusing to fight Wagner troops, along with unconfirmed reports that Voronezh is now also under Wagner control, This would put Wagner just 500km south of Moscow—what would ordinarily be a six-hour drive.
These are 180 Russian servicemen and security officials that reportedly refused to interfere with the actions of Wagner PMC and laid down their arms near the border crossing Bugayevka.49.607532391262325, 39.70969808817967 pic.twitter.com/zwSXz0x4Hy
— NOELREPORTS
Putin’s regime has reportedly mobilized troops around Moscow.
Russian Ministry of Defense columns on the move in Moscow. Access to the Presidential Administration of Russia is reportedly blocked. pic.twitter.com/omBTZiiZOk
— NOELREPORTS
Putin soon addressed the nation, declaring his intention to fight and destroy this uprising. Putin called the Wagner Group criminals, and promised that all who participated would be punished.
"I believe that we will save and defend what is dear and sacred to us. Together with our Motherland we will overcome all trials. I urged the military to make the only right choice - to stop participating in criminal activities," Putin said during his appeal. pic.twitter.com/ZkHC6S4UCQ
— NOELREPORTS
Developments remain ongoing.
Analysis
This coup represents a massive political miscalculation by Putin, which allowed a desperate Prigozhin to move against the military and the government.
One key question: Why are Wagner troops going along with Prigozhin? From the perspective of the Wagner soldiers, many have spent months fighting in the brutal trenches of Bakhmut, all the while they were being told that their comrades were dying because the Ministry of Defense was withholding shells.
Although the Ministry of Defense denied the claim, Putin did … nothing.
The Russian state’s primary power of control rests in its power to shape narratives through the control of information. Unlike the Soviet police state, which used raw power and the threat of violence to keep dissidents in line, the Russian state’s FSB (Federal Security Service) is feared—but it’s a fraction of the size of its predecessor, the KGB. Putin’s Russia instead relies on its control over the Russian media landscape to shape most people's understanding of their lived realities.
However, in the case of Prigozhin, perhaps because Wagner was being set up as a competing counterweight to the Ministry of Defense, so long as Prigozhin avoided directly criticizing Putin himself, his virulent denunciations of the Ministry of Defense went unchallenged by state media.
This gave credibility to Prigozhin’s claims of the Ministry of Defense’s corruption and incompetence, which likely resonated particularly strongly with the soldiers in his command.
Brazen acts of defiance of the Ministry of Defense, like the kidnapping and torture of Lt. Col. Venevitin, likely gave Wagner troops confidence that Prigozhin was more powerful than the Ministry, and had Putin’s tacit approval in these actions.
Then it appeared that Wagner had reached its final act: Wagner was being all but disbanded, having served its purpose in capturing Bakhmut. The remaining soldiers were being contracted to the Ministry of Defense, and Prigozhin was essentially being told to submit, or be removed, with an ultimatum to expire on July 1.
But Putin’s second miscalculation was to do this when 25,000 Wagner troops were pulled off the front lines and had freedom of movement.
It’s not entirely clear exactly how much military power Putin even has at his immediate disposal.
Reference this May 20, 2023, Defense Intelligence Memorandum from the United Kingdom.
A few weeks before the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Ukraine began a series of local counterattacks in Bakhmut that threatened the flanks of the Russian positions north and south of the city. Losing ground, Russia rushed reinforcements to Bakhmut.
The UK report notes that Russia “redeployed up to several battalions to reinforce the Bakhmut sector.” Furthermore, it notes “Russia likely maintain(s) relatively few uncommitted combat units in Ukraine, the redeployment represents a notable commitment by Russian command.”
These statements give some hints as to the scope of Russian reserves, based on UK intelligence estimates.
At the time, Russia appeared to commit five to six additional battalions in the Bakhmut sector. If five or six battalions are a “notable commitment,” it might be reasonable to assume that they represent at least 15-20% of Russian reserves. A commitment of just 10% or fewer Russian reserves would seem odd to characterize as “notable.”
On that basis, Russia has, at most, 30-40 Battalions of strategic reserves in the entire Ukrainian theater of operations. Perhaps 50. A Russian battalion is generally around 600-800 troops, so this would represent around 20,000-35,000 troops.
And thus Russia’s entire strategic reserve in the Ukrainian battlefield may represent approximately similar or fewer troops than Prigozhin has at his disposal: allegedly 25,000.
Furthermore, Russia has been steadily denuding its army formations within Russia to strengthen its combat forces in Ukraine. Most of the elite reserve forces intended to block an attack by NATO, like the 1st Guards Tank Army, have long since been committed to Ukraine—and largely devastated. A Feb. 15 report from the UK Ministry of Defense suggested that 97% of Russia’s combat forces were committed within Ukraine.
Supporting the idea that Russian defenses in its mainland are virtually nonexistent, Freedom of Russia Legion troops—that claimed to be of battalion size (at most several hundred troops)—seemingly crossed the Russo-Ukrainian border freely, to raid Russian villages in Belgorod. One raid, that started on June 4, managed to hold the village of Novaya Tavolzhanka until around June 15. The fact that a lightly armed group of infantry could not only freely cross the border virtually at will, but maintain a position within Russia for over a week indicates the weakness of any forces available for Russia near the borders.
Moscow may be significantly better defended than the bordering regions. However, the general assumption that Russian troops should be able to crush the 25,000 Wagnerites with ease does not seem supported by evidence.
This is not to say that Wagner forces will capture Moscow, or that they will succeed in their attempt to decapitate the military. But, in my opinion, it is not at all clear that Putin has the forces necessary to crush Wagner’s attempted coup, particularly in a short period.
Wagner forces appear to have fully cut Russian lines of supply to the Russian armies in Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimean Oblasts. If it takes weeks for the Russians to suppress the Wagner uprising, the Russian army’s defensive positions in southern Ukraine may collapse from a lack of supply.
I can’t think of a better way to put this than this comment from a stellar Putin parody account.