HIMARS O’clock Theater has become a fan favorite with those backing Ukraine against Russia’s murderous hordes. There’s very little more satisfying than seeing Russia’s weapons of death and destruction go up in fire and smoke, deep inside their lines. Meanwhile, after long dismissing the potential of HIMARS to significantly affect the trajectory of the war, there is now fear, outrage, and grudging respect from Russian bloggers covering the war. Let’s take a look:
Military Informant, a Russian milblogger with over 400,000 followers on Telegram, uses the word “panic.” (Run through Google translate)
Guided MLRS rockets have much shorter air time (around 90 seconds at max distance) than ATACMS would (around six minutes at range). Few air defenses will properly protect against regular MLRS rockets. But ATACMS should be vulnerable, not just because of air time, but because only 1-2 can be launched per vehicle (depending on whether it’s HIMARS or M270 MLRS), and each rocket is a much bigger target. (Remember, one pod carries either six GMLRS, or one ATACMS.)
That said, Russia has shown zero ability to hunt and destroy HIMARS. Ukraine operates them at night, when Russia’s crappy drones are blind. And the launchers are long gone before counter-battery can find and target them.
Interestingly, back in my day we assumed Soviet spies would track our movements from barracks to deployed positions during an outbreak of war. (In case you don’t know, my job in the Army was fire direction for an MLRS battery in Germany, supporting a cavalry unit patrolling the Czechoslovakian border.) Never knew if it was true or bullshit rumors, but this guy seems to think that was actually the case.
Igor Girkin, indicted war criminal and former commander of the Donbas armies in the 2014 war:
Everyone is assuming Ukraine will get the long-range ATACMS rockets, yet none of that has been announced, or even hinted at, by the American side. Could be wishful thinking from Ukrainians, and worst-case scenario planning by the Russians, but who knows. Would be great to push Russian supply depots even further away from the front lines, though ATACMS would undoubtedly be more vulnerable to Russian air defenses, and at $1 million per rocket, they make the regular guided MLRS rockets at $130,000 seem like a bargain. Even then, the issue might be less the cost, and more the fact that not that many ATACMS were ever produced (only around 50,000, and many delivered to buyers who aren’t supplying Ukraine, or wouldn’t give up their expensive-to-replace rockets).
We hear from Yanina, says the Russian army is run by morons, the same as the country’s civilian leadership.
In case you need the refresher, this was the Stakhanov attack:
The depot cooked off for days. Reading this, you might think, “how the hell is this Russian blogger not thrown off a balcony”? Dmitri of War Translated suggests it’s because their “critique becomes an alternative to the victorious propaganda which can be fed to the TV-watching zombies but doesn’t work for the layers of the Russian society that are resistant to it.” In other words, the milbloggers’ critiques are a sort of pressure valve for Russians who can use the internet and see the “special operation” isn’t going so well. A group of milbloggers actually met with Vladimir Putin himself recently. They serve a role.
Here are more examples rounded up at the site War Translated:
Dimitriyev, with over 100,000 followers on Telegram:
Boy are they pissing their pants at the thought of ATACMS arriving, huh? And he doesn’t even note the best benefit of taking out Russian air defenses (which is already happening): TB2 Bayraktar drones and the Ukrainian Air Force can better support counteroffensive operations.
Here is Russian “military expert” Khatylyev cited by Russian news outlet RIA Novosti, on the HIMARS strike on Nova Kakhova:
Reminder, that was this attack:
So first of all, no, three American satellites didn’t hover over Nova Kakhova to look for Russian troops. That’s not how Satellites work. They orbit. Second of all, there was no need for satellites, as other milbloggers point out, Russia didn’t bother concealing these depots, thinking them safe. They're located close to railheads, and drones can track back supply trucks to and from their supply sources. Finally, Kherson Oblast has an active partisan and sympathetic civilian base to track such matters. There is literally a phone app civilians can use to report troop movements and locations. And thirdly, there have been more attacks like this since. This wasn’t a one-off, despite the fanciful claims by this “analyst.”
Of all the HIMARS attacks, the Nova Kakhova one generated real angst. Here’s some additional reactions also aggregated by War Translated:
Novorissiya Militia Summaries, with 300,000 Telegram followers:
Imagine thinking Russia is a “paradise.”
Starshe Eddy, with over 400,000 followers on Telegram:
Military Observer, again, says “good luck” to dispersing command posts, warehouses, and other logistical infrastructure:
AWACS are “airborne warning and control system,” which is a staple of Western military doctrine. In fact, there are several NATO (and Swedish) AWACS planes flying around Ukraine at all times, listening in to Russian communications and using fancy gear to pinpoint the location of high value targets—like say, the location of command posts, or the Moskva before it was sunk.
Crazy that Russia doesn’t have AWACS capability. China certainly does, as do small countries like Finland. But Russia, self-styler global superpower, has no way to keep an electronic eye over the battlefield. Also unfathomable that Russia doesn’t have air superiority over Ukraine. Russia is supposed to have over 4,000 combat aircraft, yet perhaps we’ve seen a few dozen.
Dmitriyev, again:
Meanwhile, we’re seeing less dramatic weapons depots go up in smoke. Ukraine has hit over two dozen of them in the last several weeks, and is moving on to less dramatic targets—command and control (C2) and air defenses.
Also, I’ve written before about the maintenance challenges of fielding MLRS systems. I’d factor in significant downtime, especially for the M270s once they’re fully operational. (The first ones have just arrived in Ukraine.)
And while it’s nice to see Russians fretting about HIMARS, what’s really important is the effect it has on the war. We know Russian advances have slowed to a crawl, and that FIRMS satellite data shows dramatically lower artillery fires. This confirms all that:
Ironically, after a week of low fires on NASA’s satellite imagery, today it’s looking pretty intense across the entire front. I’ll be looking later to see how much of it is falling on Ukraine’s side of the front lines.
Saturday, Jul 16, 2022 · 6:06:59 PM +00:00 · kos
When I started Daily Kos, I had no kids. Now my oldest, Ari, is at Ft. Benning doing advanced infantry training. Here he is on the right, obviously thrilled to have his first day pass—and most importantly, access to his phone.
My son Ari, right, on a rare day off from infantry training.
After graduation, he’ll be doing pre-ranger schools, as he’s hell-bent on getting Ranger tab.
Saturday, Jul 16, 2022 · 7:21:08 PM +00:00 · kos
The propaganda/psyops value of HIMARS cannot be overstated. It’s clearly a huge morale boost for the Ukrainian side.
Saturday, Jul 16, 2022 · 7:23:37 PM +00:00 · kos
See?
Saturday, Jul 16, 2022 · 11:40:58 PM +00:00 · kos
Yup, most of today’s fire is in temporarily occupied Russian territory.
Military Informant, a Russian milblogger with over 400,000 followers on Telegram, uses the word “panic.” (Run through Google translate)
Guided MLRS rockets have much shorter air time (around 90 seconds at max distance) than ATACMS would (around six minutes at range). Few air defenses will properly protect against regular MLRS rockets. But ATACMS should be vulnerable, not just because of air time, but because only 1-2 can be launched per vehicle (depending on whether it’s HIMARS or M270 MLRS), and each rocket is a much bigger target. (Remember, one pod carries either six GMLRS, or one ATACMS.)
That said, Russia has shown zero ability to hunt and destroy HIMARS. Ukraine operates them at night, when Russia’s crappy drones are blind. And the launchers are long gone before counter-battery can find and target them.
Interestingly, back in my day we assumed Soviet spies would track our movements from barracks to deployed positions during an outbreak of war. (In case you don’t know, my job in the Army was fire direction for an MLRS battery in Germany, supporting a cavalry unit patrolling the Czechoslovakian border.) Never knew if it was true or bullshit rumors, but this guy seems to think that was actually the case.
Igor Girkin, indicted war criminal and former commander of the Donbas armies in the 2014 war:
Everyone is assuming Ukraine will get the long-range ATACMS rockets, yet none of that has been announced, or even hinted at, by the American side. Could be wishful thinking from Ukrainians, and worst-case scenario planning by the Russians, but who knows. Would be great to push Russian supply depots even further away from the front lines, though ATACMS would undoubtedly be more vulnerable to Russian air defenses, and at $1 million per rocket, they make the regular guided MLRS rockets at $130,000 seem like a bargain. Even then, the issue might be less the cost, and more the fact that not that many ATACMS were ever produced (only around 50,000, and many delivered to buyers who aren’t supplying Ukraine, or wouldn’t give up their expensive-to-replace rockets).
We hear from Yanina, says the Russian army is run by morons, the same as the country’s civilian leadership.
In case you need the refresher, this was the Stakhanov attack:
️English (@TpyxaNews) The depot cooked off for days. Reading this, you might think, “how the hell is this Russian blogger not thrown off a balcony”? Dmitri of War Translated suggests it’s because their “critique becomes an alternative to the victorious propaganda which can be fed to the TV-watching zombies but doesn’t work for the layers of the Russian society that are resistant to it.” In other words, the milbloggers’ critiques are a sort of pressure valve for Russians who can use the internet and see the “special operation” isn’t going so well. A group of milbloggers actually met with Vladimir Putin himself recently. They serve a role.
Here are more examples rounded up at the site War Translated:
Dimitriyev, with over 100,000 followers on Telegram:
Boy are they pissing their pants at the thought of ATACMS arriving, huh? And he doesn’t even note the best benefit of taking out Russian air defenses (which is already happening): TB2 Bayraktar drones and the Ukrainian Air Force can better support counteroffensive operations.
Here is Russian “military expert” Khatylyev cited by Russian news outlet RIA Novosti, on the HIMARS strike on Nova Kakhova:
Reminder, that was this attack:
So first of all, no, three American satellites didn’t hover over Nova Kakhova to look for Russian troops. That’s not how Satellites work. They orbit. Second of all, there was no need for satellites, as other milbloggers point out, Russia didn’t bother concealing these depots, thinking them safe. They're located close to railheads, and drones can track back supply trucks to and from their supply sources. Finally, Kherson Oblast has an active partisan and sympathetic civilian base to track such matters. There is literally a phone app civilians can use to report troop movements and locations. And thirdly, there have been more attacks like this since. This wasn’t a one-off, despite the fanciful claims by this “analyst.”
Of all the HIMARS attacks, the Nova Kakhova one generated real angst. Here’s some additional reactions also aggregated by War Translated:
Novorissiya Militia Summaries, with 300,000 Telegram followers:
Imagine thinking Russia is a “paradise.”
Starshe Eddy, with over 400,000 followers on Telegram:
Military Observer, again, says “good luck” to dispersing command posts, warehouses, and other logistical infrastructure:
AWACS are “airborne warning and control system,” which is a staple of Western military doctrine. In fact, there are several NATO (and Swedish) AWACS planes flying around Ukraine at all times, listening in to Russian communications and using fancy gear to pinpoint the location of high value targets—like say, the location of command posts, or the Moskva before it was sunk.
Crazy that Russia doesn’t have AWACS capability. China certainly does, as do small countries like Finland. But Russia, self-styler global superpower, has no way to keep an electronic eye over the battlefield. Also unfathomable that Russia doesn’t have air superiority over Ukraine. Russia is supposed to have over 4,000 combat aircraft, yet perhaps we’ve seen a few dozen.
Dmitriyev, again:
Meanwhile, we’re seeing less dramatic weapons depots go up in smoke. Ukraine has hit over two dozen of them in the last several weeks, and is moving on to less dramatic targets—command and control (C2) and air defenses.
Also, I’ve written before about the maintenance challenges of fielding MLRS systems. I’d factor in significant downtime, especially for the M270s once they’re fully operational. (The first ones have just arrived in Ukraine.)
And while it’s nice to see Russians fretting about HIMARS, what’s really important is the effect it has on the war. We know Russian advances have slowed to a crawl, and that FIRMS satellite data shows dramatically lower artillery fires. This confirms all that:
Ironically, after a week of low fires on NASA’s satellite imagery, today it’s looking pretty intense across the entire front. I’ll be looking later to see how much of it is falling on Ukraine’s side of the front lines.
Saturday, Jul 16, 2022 · 6:06:59 PM +00:00 · kos
When I started Daily Kos, I had no kids. Now my oldest, Ari, is at Ft. Benning doing advanced infantry training. Here he is on the right, obviously thrilled to have his first day pass—and most importantly, access to his phone.
My son Ari, right, on a rare day off from infantry training.
After graduation, he’ll be doing pre-ranger schools, as he’s hell-bent on getting Ranger tab.
Saturday, Jul 16, 2022 · 7:21:08 PM +00:00 · kos
The propaganda/psyops value of HIMARS cannot be overstated. It’s clearly a huge morale boost for the Ukrainian side.
Saturday, Jul 16, 2022 · 7:23:37 PM +00:00 · kos
See?
Saturday, Jul 16, 2022 · 11:40:58 PM +00:00 · kos
Yup, most of today’s fire is in temporarily occupied Russian territory.